Tax Avoidance, Corporate Governance and Firm Value in The Digital Era by Yee, Chen Siew et al.
 Jai | Journal of Accounting and Investment, vol. 19 no. 2, July 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tax Avoidance, Corporate Governance and 
Firm Value in The Digital Era 
 
Chen Siew Yee, Noor Sharoja Sapiei*, Mazni Abdullah 
 
ABSTRACT: In this study, we examine the link between tax avoidance and firm value 
and identify the moderating effect of corporate governance in this digital era. 
Corporate tax avoidance activities have been considered as value-enhancement 
activities to the companies and better quality of corporate governance would 
positively related to firm value. This study uses a sample of Malaysian Public Listed 
Companies (PLCs) which ranked the top 100 companies of good disclosure in the 
Malaysia-ASEAN corporate governance report 2014. It was conducted using cross-
sectional data by observing a final sample of 82 PLCs at one point in time. We 
provide evidence from Malaysia that corporate tax avoidance behaviour would 
actually reduce firm value and corporate governance has moderator effect on the 
relationship of tax avoidance and firm value. This study offers practical insights to 
the government and policymakers in understanding the tax avoidance behaviour of 
company and it helps in forming adequate and effective taxation system in 
Malaysia. We also give constructive apprehension to Malaysian companies to 
understand the negative consequences of corporate tax avoidance when engaging 
in tax planning activities aggressively. Most importantly, this study added more 
evidence to the stream of literature that investigates the role of tax avoidance 
strategies, as moderated by the level of corporate governance, in determining the 
firm value in this era of technology. 
 
KEYWORDS: tax avoidance; firm value; corporate governance; digital era 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Tax avoidance activities by big corporations have become quite rampant in 
this era of digital technology. The Digital Era is characterized by technology 
which boost the speed and breadth of information turnover within the 
economy and society (Shepherd, 2004). The growing numbers of tax 
avoidance and evasion activities may partly be attributed to technology as 
corporations with their exquisite tax planning teams started to deploy 
technology. The recent real-life example is the case of Starbucks Company 
faces millions of Euros in tax repayments when the European Commission's 
issued a decision in 2016 on tax avoidance by multinational companies 
through transfer pricing activities. Taxes has been considered a factor that 
affects the financial decision-making of a company such as with regards to 
forming and restructuring of organization, financing decisions, 
compensation policy, payout policy and even the risk management of a firm 
(Graham, 2003; Desai & Dharmapala, 2006).  
 
Corporate tax avoidance activity is an arrangement of one’s financial and 
economic affairs to minimize the tax payable by utilizing allowable 
deductions, exemptions, and allowances within the provision of the law 
(Pasternak & Rico, 2008). In general, Malaysian Judiciary embraces the 
world-wide principle stating that it is perfectly legitimate to make 
arrangement to reduce tax liability as long as what they do is not prohibited  
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by law. Thus, the corporate tax avoidance pursued by companies have been 
considered as value-enhancement activities by reducing the income to be 
paid out as corporate tax to government. However, the tax avoidance 
activities do not come without cost as the separation of ownership and 
control between managers and shareholders posts the agency cost to 
company (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In principal-agents relationship, the 
agents to whom the shareholders delegate the managerial role have great 
chances to divert partial of the potential incomes of company to themselves. 
The tax saving from tax avoidance may be outweighed by the direct cost 
such as implementation cost, potential punishment and indirect cost 
including agency cost related to the tax saving activities (Desai & 
Dharmapala, 2009; Chen, Hu, Wang, & Tang, 2014). In addition, Kim, Li and 
Zhang (2010) suggests that complicated and opaque tax avoidance 
arrangements allow managers in manipulating earnings of company and 
hiding negative firm-specific information.  
 
While tax saving strategy is one of the crucial managerial decisions 
determined by the managers, the complex tax avoidance arrangement 
always provides a shield for the managers to extract own benefits in the 
absence of governance control. Corporate governance has been the 
processes and structures adopted by the company to manage its business 
activities and by doing so, it enhances the shareholders’ value (Mustapha & 
Ayoib, 2010). The corporate governance is of paramount importance 
especially to the developing countries lack of investor protection and with 
severe agency problems (Wang, 2011).  
 
In Malaysia, the Malaysian code on corporate governance (MCCG) was 
introduced in 2000 to respond to changing stakeholder expectation and to 
protect the minority shareholders. Corporate governance has been closely 
associated with corporate transparency and may have a compelling force on 
the extent of disclosure and timeliness of reporting (Haat, Rahman & 
Mahenthiran, 2008). Thus, corporate governance has been viewed as one of 
the measures in governing shareholders’ benefit extracted from tax 
avoidance. Given the fact that the governance mechanism has an interactive 
effect to moderate the relationship between tax avoidance and firm value, 
this study will investigate further on the tax avoidance activities engaged by 
Malaysian companies with different level of governance control. 
 
The objective of this study is therefore to analyse whether tax avoidance 
activities affect firm value and to identify whether the relationship is 
moderated by the strength of corporate governance. This paper examines 
the effect of tax avoidance on firm value in the business environment in 
Malaysia and if the governance mechanism plays a role in moderating the 
relationship. This investigation would be able to answer the fundamental 
question of value transferred to shareholders and whether the relationship 
between tax avoidance and firm value varies with different level of 
corporate governance. While a stream of emerging literature of corporate 
governance finds that better quality of corporate governance is positively 
related to firm value, this study examines whether the MCCG which 
integrated as part of the business of Malaysian companies will improve the 
firm value when companies engaged in the tax avoidance activities. We 
further extend the previous studies by analysing the relationship between 
tax avoidance and firm value in the developing country in the digital era. 
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Even though a great extent of academic researchers has examined tax 
avoidance in developed countries over a long period of time, evidence for 
this subject gathered from developing countries is limited (Ariff & Hashim, 
2013).  
 
In the study of Noor, Fadzillah and Mastuki (2010) which attempts to 
examine corporate effective tax rate of Malaysia Public Listed Companies 
(PLCs) revealed that the corporate tax system in Malaysia indeed provided 
tax incentives to companies to pursue aggressive tax planning extensively. 
Besides, agency conflicts, risk of managerial rent diversion and weak investor 
protection is eminent in developing countries (Arif & Hashim, 2013). Given 
that, it is interesting to extend the literatures of tax avoidance by examining 
the relationship of tax avoidance and firm value in agency framework in 
developing countries.  
 
In Section 2, a comprehensive literature review has been conducted on two 
emerging streams of research: tax avoidance and corporate governance and 
hypotheses have been developed. In Section 3, the research methodology 
includes sample selection, the operationalization, source of information and 
measurement of variables and the regression models. Section 4 discusses 
the findings of this study. Lastly, Section 5 provide linking between 
problems, questions and the findings conclusions, and discusses the 
limitations and contributions of the study, providing the directions for future 
study and indicates the implications in the context of Malaysia and the 
developing country in general. 
 
 
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Tax Avoidance 
Tax avoidance has been viewed as tax saving activities that enhance the 
value of company. It has been used as a tax saving tool to transfer the 
wealth from government to company’s shareholders. Hanlon and Heitzman 
(2010) have broadly defined tax avoidance as reduction of explicit taxes with 
perfectly legal tax saving activities at one end whereas tax sheltering 
activities would be closer to the other end. Tax shelters were defined by U.S. 
General Accounting Office (2003) as complicated tax reporting that used to 
explore tax loopholes and provide unintended, substantial benefits to 
corporations. Although some researchers argue that tax avoidance strategies 
could be a legal or illegal mean of activities (see for example Lee, Dobiyanski 
& Minton, 2015), in this study, we defined tax avoidance as legitimate tax 
planning activities in accordance with Malaysian Judiciary who adopts the 
Westminster principle. The principle proclaimed that corporation have every 
right to make financial planning to avoid or reduce their tax liability as long 
as what they do is not forbidden by authorities or law. In this study we adopt 
the financial economics perspective to investigate on how agency theory 
affects the relationship between tax avoidance and firm value.  
 
Corporate tax avoidance is one of the corporate strategies that received 
considerable attention in the boardroom and involving managerial decision 
and discretion (Arif & Hashim, 2013). In recent years, the corporate tax 
becomes a topic of research that received widespread of interest (Hanlon & 
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Heitzman, 2010) and induces more studies on tax avoidance. Initially when 
the body of research on corporate tax is rather scarce, the deterrence model 
of tax evasion by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) which studied the individual 
taxpayers has been utilised. In the model, the taxpayers would favour in 
reducing the tax if the expected utility from tax evasion is greater than the 
risk of being caught and being penalized by the authorities. However, 
scholars in the area argue that the model may not appropriate to be used for 
the studies on corporate taxpayer.  
 
The PLCs are operated by managers and thus the tax planning strategies 
involve multiple parties and they have the absolute discretionary power of 
deciding on tax planning activities on behalf of shareholders. Given that the 
separation of ownership and control, the agency framework provides a 
better insight and theoretical foundation in understanding the corporate tax 
reporting behaviour of the managers (Slemrod, 2004; Crocker & Slemrod, 
2005; Chen & Chu, 2005). Several analytical researchers have conducted the 
study on corporate tax avoidance activities using agency framework (Chen & 
Chu, 2005; Desai & Dharmapala, 2009). From the perspective of agency 
theory, the managers involve in the tax planning are able to ride on the 
nature of tax avoidance transactions that full of complexity in pursuing self-
serving benefits. The complex tax planning technologies provide a shield 
from the investigation of internal audit committee, outside auditors and 
other parties.  
Corporate Tax Avoidance and Firm Value 
Many prior studies have investigated the consequences of corporate tax 
avoidance in the capital market. Empirical studies about the effect of tax 
avoidance on corporate value have mixed results. Early studies relate 
effective tax rate (ETR) as the measurements of tax avoidance to various firm 
characteristics. Zimmerman (1983) found that companies which are 
relatively large in term of firm size to other companies would subject to a 
higher ETR. His finding is in line with the notion that more successful 
business subject to more stringent scrutiny and transferred more wealth to 
the government.  In addition, Gupta and Newberry (1997) found that capital 
structure, asset mix and profitability are associated with ETR. These firm 
characteristics examined in the early studies are proxies for incentive, 
opportunities and sources induce company involving in tax planning and 
they provide some explanation of why some companies avoid more tax in 
relative to other companies. These firm characteristics will be used as 
control variables in this study to form the regression equation to test our 
hypotheses.  
 
In later study, Desai and Dharmapala (2009) view corporate tax avoidance 
activities as a negative influence on firm value due to agency problem. In the 
agent-principal relationship, the information asymmetry would favour the 
managers who possess more information and the muddled tax avoidance 
process is even a shield for managers to engage to self-serving activities 
(Desai & Dharmapala, 2009). Thus, the tax avoidance might not necessary 
enhance the wealth of shareholders in the existence of agency problem in 
the companies. The classic example is manager of Enron who involved in tax 
shield by structuring financing transactions and manipulating earnings of 
company eventually led to the failure of company. Hanlon and Slemrod 
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(2009) also found that the market reacts negatively to the companies that 
involve in the tax shelter aggressively. Similarly, Chen, Hu, Wang, and Tang 
(2014) and Rezaei and Ghanaeenejad (2014) found a negative meaningful 
relation between tax avoidance and firm value. Thus, later studies conducted 
in the developed countries argued that tax avoidance does not necessarily 
enhance the valuation of companies. These studies provided very interesting 
insights of the determinants and consequences of tax avoidance which 
employed by companies to reduce tax. However, Arif and Hashim (2013) and 
Moradi, Mohammadi and Saeedi (2015) provided a preliminary evidence in 
Malaysia that corporate tax avoidance enhances the value of companies as 
tax avoidance activities are positively related to firm value. Therefore, due to 
the contradictory effect of tax avoidance activities found in the developed 
and developing countries, this study attempts to investigate the tax 
avoidance and firm value in the agency framework. The first hypothesis is 
stated as follows: 
 
H1: Tax avoidance is significantly associated with firm value of companies in 
Malaysia 
 
 
Corporate Governance  
 
The first hypothesis examines the single consequence of corporate tax 
avoidance from the agency perspective and it does not consider that the 
agency cost can be moderated by corporate governance. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) describe corporate governance as “the system of control 
mechanisms, through which the suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting a return on their investment”.  The definition signified 
the importance of corporate governance mechanism in safeguarding the 
interest of shareholders, and stakeholders. Agency theorists have viewed the 
tax avoidance issues intertwined with corporate governance issues (Chen, 
Hu, Wang, & Tang, 2014).  
 
The empirical literature indicated that the corporate governance has 
counteracting effect on the agency problem and suggested that the 
corporate value is the result of this counteracting mechanism of control on 
this matter. Desai and Dharmapala (2006) suggested that the impact of high-
power incentive on tax sheltering may vary and it depends on the 
governance structure of the companies. Desai and Dharmapala (2009) found 
that tax avoidance will increase the firm value for the company of well-
governed companies and it is otherwise for poorly-governed companies. 
Similarly, Chen, Hu, Wang, and Tang (2014) found that the tax avoidance 
behaviour tends to decrease the value of the firm resulted from increased 
agency costs, but the negative influence of tax avoidance on firm value is 
mitigated in well-governed companies. 
 
Likewise, in Malaysia, Arif and Hashim (2013) provided a preliminary 
evidence that corporate tax avoidance enhances the value of companies and 
the value relevance is higher for companies in better governance compared 
to their counterparts. The MCCG 2000 was issued to respond to the regional 
financial crisis in 1997/1998 as it was believed to be attributed to lack of 
good corporate governance. The regulatory bodies in Malaysia shed the light 
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H1 
Moderator Variable 
H2 
on implementing a good set of corporate governance practices and we are 
one of the first countries in East Asia with its own Code of Corporate 
Governance.  The landscape of the country’s corporate governance was 
continually reformed as the MCCG 2012 recognizes the role and fiduciary 
obligation of the directors not just in setting competitive strategies and 
steering the business in the right direction, but also playing an important 
role in establishing a sound governance structure and ensuring that the daily 
business is conducted in compliance with laws and ethical values.  
 
Overall, the literatures indicated that the shareholders/investors are 
protected with the corporate governance in place and studies mostly find a 
link between corporate governance, which works as a firm monitoring 
mechanism. In consideration of the fact that the agency problem 
intertwined with the complex tax avoidance activities, this study postulates 
that corporate governance mechanisms would able to mitigate the agency 
problem and enhance the relationship between tax avoidance and the firm 
value. Thus, it is hypothesized that the level of corporate governance of a 
company will moderate the causal effect of tax avoidance on firm value. The 
second hypothesis is stated as follows: 
 
H2: The relationship between tax avoidance and firm value will be moderated 
by the level of corporate governance of companies in Malaysia. 
 
 
In the Malaysia institutional setting, this study tries to figure out the effect of 
corporate tax avoidance on firm value and examining the moderation effect 
of corporate governance between the relation of tax avoidance and firm 
value.  Figure 1 shows the research framework of this study. 
 
 
Research Method 
 
The aim of this study is to examine whether tax avoidance activities affect 
firm value and to identify whether the strength of corporate governance 
moderates the relationship. We utilized a quantitative research method and 
secondary data is collected in our study, focusing on company as a unit 
analysis.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 1 Research Framework 
 
Corporate Tax 
Avoidance 
Firm Value 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable 
Corporate 
Governance 
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           Table 1 Summary of Sample Selection 
Sample Selection Number of companies 
 Number of Public Listed Companies in MACGR 2014 100 
Less: Financial and Insurance Companies (10) 
Less: Companies with incomplete financial data  (1) 
Less: Companies with operating loss (1) 
Less: Companies with negative operating cash flow (6) 
Final Sample 82 
 
Sample Selection 
 
In this study, the sample of companies is selected based on the listing of top 
100 companies in the Malaysia-Asean Corporate Governance Report 
(MACGR) 2014 prepared by Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG). 
The report provides a snapshot of the PLCs in Malaysia of their compliance 
with principles and practices in corporate governance. The assessment of 
the companies mainly based on the rights of shareholders, equitable 
treatments of shareholders, roles of stakeholders, disclosure and 
transparency and responsibilities of the board. The financial and market data 
for each of the selected companies are extracted from the audited annual 
report of fiscal year end of 2013.  The initial sample of companies have been 
filtered based on the characteristics in Table 1. The companies in the 
financial and insurances sector were excluded from the sample selection as 
the corporations such as banks are highly regulated by governmental 
authorities and they have different financial characteristics. The companies 
without complete financial and market data that needs to be used in the 
analysis were rejected. The companies with operating loss negative 
operating cash flow were also filtered out as the companies with taxable loss 
are not subject to statutory corporate tax. The final sample consists of 82 
companies were used in this study.  
 
Table 2 Operationalization and Source of Information 
Variables Acronym Operationalization Source of Information 
Dependent:     
Tobin’s Q Q (MV of Ordinary Shares + total borrowing) 
/ total assets 
Annual report for financial 
year ending 2013 (AR 2013) 
Independent:    
Tax Avoidance 
 
TA 1 – [current-year tax expense / the 
accounting income before tax] 
AR 2013 
Governance GOV ACGS MACGR 2014 
Control:    
Return of Assets ROA Net income / total assets AR 2013 
Return of Equity ROE Net income / shareholders’ equity AR 2013 
Size SIZE Total Assets AR 2013 
Leverage LEV Total debts / total assets AR 2013 
Growth GROWTH (Revenues Y2 – Revenues Y1)/ Revenues Y2 AR 2013 
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Operationalization, Source of Information and Measurement of Variables 
The operationalization and source of information of the independent, 
dependent and control variables are provided in Table 2. The research 
design in terms of measurement of variables and regression models is then 
discussed. 
Measurement of Firm Value 
Tobin’s Q is used in this study as a proxy for firm value of a company. This 
follows the practice in the stream of research that studied tax avoidance and 
firm value particularly, Moradi, Mohammadi and Saeedi (2015) and Lim 
(2011). The calculation will be employed in this study as a proxy of valuation 
of company as follow: 
 
Tobin’s Q = book value of total debt + market value of common equity 
book value of total assets 
Measurement of Corporate Tax Avoidance 
As the tax returns of the company are highly confidential and unlikely to be 
accessible to public, we can only use various empirical proxies to estimate 
the tax returns of company based on publicly available information as 
suggested by Stewart (1981). In this study, we measure the activities of tax 
avoidance by examining the proportion of tax liability to accounting earnings 
of company using ETR. It is widely used as a measurement of tax avoidance 
activities of companies in Malaysia (see for examples, Noor, Fadzillah & 
Mastuki, 2010; Ariffin, 2013; Arif & Hashim, 2013; Salihu, Obid & Annuar, 
2014). There are several variants of ETR include accounting, current and 
long-run cash and each of these variants has its merits and limitations. We 
utilise current ETR by dividing current-year tax expense by the accounting 
income before tax.  Current ETR has its merit because current-year tax 
expense is used instead of aggregate tax expenses and it is able to reflect the 
tax deferral strategies of a company. The tax avoidance transaction of the 
sample companies in this study was measured by one minus current ETR.   
Measurement of Corporate Governance 
The ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard (ACGS) is utilize to assess the 
compliance of Malaysian PLCs with practices and principles in corporate 
governance. The scorecard was formed according to the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance and other international best practices. The 
mechanics in arriving the final score for each of the companies are as 
follows: Level 1 composed of 179 items which have been divided into 5 parts 
corresponding with the OECD Principles (Table 3) and Level 2 comprised of 
32 bonus and penalty items. The bonus items were to reward companies 
which went extra miles by adopting other good governance practices and 
the penalty items were to penalize companies with poor governance 
practices. The total bonus and penalty points are added to or subtracted 
from the total score in Level 1 to give the final score for the company. The 
Top 100 companies with good disclosure are those with highest scores 
based on disclosures as per ACGS parameter among 873 companies. The 
PLCs ranked from Top 1 to 50 is defined as  “well-governed  companies”  and  
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           Table 3 The ACGR (Composition and Structure of Level 1) 
Components Number of Items Weightage (%) 
Part A: Rights of Shareholders  25 10% 
Part B: Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 17 15% 
Part C: Roles of Stakeholders 21 10% 
Part D: Disclosure and Transparency 41 25% 
Part E: Responsibilities of the Board 75 40% 
    Total  179 100% 
           Source: MACGR 2014 
given a dichotomous value of “1” while the PLCs ranked from Top 51 to 100 
is defined as “less-governed companies” and given a dichotomous value of 
“0”. 
Measurement of Control Variables  
The specific firm characteristics of return of assets (ROA), return of common 
equity (ROE), firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV) and year-on-year growth 
(GROWTH) have been added as control variables in this study. Prior studies 
have indicated that these firm characteristics as determinants of firm value. 
ROA measure the efficiency of management in using its assets to generate 
earnings and it is obtained by dividing net income with total assets of 
companies.  ROE reveals the profit generated by company using the money 
invested by shareholders and it is calculated by dividing net income by the 
value of the first course common stock of company. SIZE is measured in term 
of total assets of the company; LEV ratio defines the total debts relative to 
total assets; and GROWTH measures the percentage change of total 
revenues in current year as compared to previous year.  
Regression Models 
The regression models of this study are based on a standard valuation model 
used in the accounting literature. In the first model, we attempt to answer 
the question on whether corporate tax avoidance behaviour increase or 
decrease firm value in the agency framework. In the second model, we 
investigate if corporate governance interacts with tax avoidance and has 
moderator effect on the valuation of companies. A new term of TA*GOV has 
been added to examine the role of corporate governance in moderating the 
relationship of tax avoidance and firm value. The following specification 
models have been developed to test out the hypotheses. 
 
Qi = β0 + β1TAi + β2ROEi + β3ROAi + β4SIZEi + β5LEVi + β6GROWTHi + Ɛi                                     (1) 
 
Qi = β0 + β1TAi + β2ROEi + β3ROAi + β4SIZEi + β5LEVi + β6GROWTHi + β7(TA*GOV)i + Ɛi         (2) 
 
Where: β0 represents constant interception, β1- β7 are coefficients, i is the 
index the firm and Ɛ refers to residual error. 
  
In order to reinforce the intuition that the negative impact of tax avoidance 
activities on firm value will be lessen for a well governed company and more 
severe for a less-governed company, Model 1 has been used to re-run on 
the subsamples of well-governed and less-governed companies. The 
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subsample is used to investigate whether the firm value derived from tax 
avoidance activities will vary according to the level of governance of 
companies. 
 
 
Result and Discussion 
Descriptive Statistics  
Table 4 contains descriptive statistics relating to the independent and 
dependent variables for the Top 100 companies with good disclosures. It 
displays the analysis made up of 36 PLCs listed from Top 1 to 50 (hereinafter 
referred to as “Top-Half”) and 46 PLCs listed from Top 51 to 100 (hereinafter 
referred to as “Bottom-Half”). Outlying observations were excluded to 
provide a more representative analysis: 14 PLCs ranked in the Top-Half and 4 
PLCs ranked in the Bottom-Half have been excluded as these companies did 
not fulfil the sample selection’s criteria. 
 
Overall, tax avoidance activities of the Top-Half are almost the same as the 
Bottom-Half of 100 PLCs. The Top-Half carries the mean of tax avoidance of 
77.69% whereas the Bottom-Half carries the mean of 77.94%. Companies 
ranked in the Top-Half marked a mean of Tobin’s Q of 2.66, while the 
Bottom-Half have a lower average Tobin’s Q of 1.99. It shows that, the 
companies with better corporate governance settings in place recorded a 
higher firm value as compared to the companies listed in the Bottom-Half. 
 
The mean ROE of the Top-Half companies is 32.27 with a maximum value of 
369.91 and the Bottom-Half recorded a mean ROE of 18.02 with a maximum 
value of 64.22. Typically, the well-governed companies have higher ROE than 
the less well-governed companies. Nevertheless, the average ROA of the 
Top-Half and the Bottom-Half is quite similar with a value of 10.01 and 
10.41, respectively.  The mean size (in term of total assets) of the Top-Half 
companies is RM 17,110.28 million whereas the mean size of the Bottom-
Half is  RM 3,763.69  million.  A  high  standard  deviation of size of these two 
 
  Table 4 Descriptive Analysis for PLCs  
 Q TA  
(%) 
ROE ROA SIZE  
(RM’ mil) 
LEV GROWTH  
(%) 
Top Half (n=36)        
Minimum 0.66 37.51 0.00 0.00 738.98 0.00 -19.87 
Maximum 13.92 99.89 369.91 58.32 99,999.30 56.81 214.48 
 Mean 2.66 77.69 32.27 10.01 17,110.28 22.22 19.30 
Median 1.64 76.35 13.45 6.51 8,619.79 21.05 3.86 
Standard Deviation 2.98 11.26 65.26 11.74 22,029.37 14.20 50.18 
Bottom Half (n=46)        
Minimum 0.58 21.09 0.00 0.00 78.54 0.00 -15.86 
Maximum 6.76 99.74 64.22 38.19 27,261.28 47.76 134.19 
Mean 1.99 77.94 18.02 10.41 3,763.69 16.68 8.25 
Median 1.37 78.77 15.19 7.91 1,681.34 16.01 4.35 
Standard Deviation 1.54 11.38 14.10 8.50 5,264.26 13.94 22.23 
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groups of companies indicates that the data is widely spread. The companies 
from the Top-Half have a mean leverage of 22.22 while the Bottom-Half 
have a lower mean leverage of 16.68. On average, the Top-Half companies 
have higher debt relatives to assets as compared to companies ranked in the 
Bottom-Half. The companies from both of the groups have recorded a 
negative growth rate but Top-Half in the better corporate governance 
ranking have higher growth rate in the sampled year. 
Correlation Analysis 
Table 5 displayed the results of the Pearson Correlation analysis.  ROE and 
ROA have a strong positive effect on Q (r = 0.748, p<0.01) and (r = 0.882, 
p<0.01), respectively. The companies with higher ROE/ROA resulted in a 
higher firm value. On the contrary, the result shows that size of a company 
has a weak negative effect on firm value (r = -0.189, p<0.05). It means that a 
company possesses larger total assets which determine the size of the 
company is negatively associated with firm value. The results however 
indicate that tax avoidance, governance, leverage and growth has no 
association with firm value. The result further shown that governance has a 
medium positive correlation with size and a weak positive correlation with 
leverage. ROA and ROE are positively associated and both of them reflecting 
the financial health of a company.  
 
Multiple Linear Regression Analysis on Full Sample 
 
The results of regression analysis of these two models is presented in Table 
6. In model 1, the value of adjusted R² is 0.8160 indicates that 81.6% of the 
firm value can be explained by the 6 independent and control variables. The 
value of adjusted R² in Model 1 is considered large indicating a good model.  
In model 2, a higher value of adjusted R² of 0.8303 shows that it is a slightly 
better model. It means that 83.03% of the variability of the firm value can be 
explained by the 7 variables tested including the interaction variable of 
TA*GOV. 
 
T-test analysis has been employed to test out the two hypotheses 
developed in this study. By referring to Model, it shows that TA has a 
significant  negative  relationship  with  Q (β = -0.0253, p < 0.05). This implies  
 
  Table 5 Correlations Analysis for PLCs  
 Q  TA GOV ROE ROA SIZE  LEV GROWTH  
Q 1        
TA .036 1       
GOV .146 -.011 1      
ROE .748** .054 .159 1     
ROA .882** .170 -.020 .720** 1    
SIZE -.189* .116 .406** -.101 -.208* 1   
LEV -.043 .086 .194* .063 -.154 .147 1  
GROWTH -.136 -.143 .148 -.062 -.140 .143 .109 1 
               **Significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed) *Significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
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Table 6 Empirical Result of Regression Analysis on Full Sample  
DV: Q Model 1  
(Test for H1) 
Model 2  
(Test for H2) 
Coefficient Std. 
Error 
t-
statistic 
Prob. Coefficient Std. 
Error 
t-
statistic 
Prob. 
C 1.8655 0.7872 2.3697 0.0204 1.8804 0.7560 2.4873 0.0152 
TA -0.0253 0.0103 -2.4466 0.0168 -0.0270 0.0099 -2.7164 0.0082 
ROE 0.0093 0.0037 2.5122 0.0142 0.0075 0.0036 2.0503 0.0439 
ROA 0.1821 0.0176 10.354 0.0000 0.1846 0.0169 10.914 0.0000 
SIZE 7.5707 7.0606 0.1072 0.9149 -7.5906 7.4606 -1.0178 0.3121 
LEV 0.0153 0.0084 1.8332 0.0708 0.0124 0.0081 1.5371 0.1286 
GROWTH -0.0024 0.0030 -0.7867 0.4340 -0.0029 0.0029 -0.9859 0.3275 
TA*GOV  0.0084 0.0031 2.6913 0.0088 
R-squared 0.8298 0.8451 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8160 0.8303 
F-statistic 60.1224 56.916 
Prob. (F-Statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 
Durbin-Watson 2.0356 2.1143 
 
 
that the tax avoidance activities will decrease the firm value as agency costs 
come along with tax avoidance activities. The beta coefficient of TA is -
0.0253 and can be interpreted as 1 unit increase in tax avoidance will reduce 
the firm value by 0.0253 unit. The control variables of ROE, ROA and LEV 
exhibit a significant positive relationship with Q. The companies with higher 
net income and engaged in debt financing would have a higher firm value. 
However, SIZE and GROWTH do not have any significant effect on firm value. 
 
In Model 2, the interaction variable of TA*GOV has been added to the 
equation to test out if governance moderates the relationship between tax 
avoidance and firm value. Similar with Model 1, we found that TA has a 
significant negative relationship with Q (β = -0.0270, p < 0.05). Tax avoidance 
activities will decrease the firm value even though corporate governance has 
been employed in safeguarding the shareholders interest resulted from tax 
avoidance.  
 
Multiple Linear Regression Analysis on Subset Samples 
 
To distinguish the effect of corporate avoidance on firm value for two subset 
samples: the group of well-governed PLCs (Top-Half) and the less-governed 
PLCs (Bottom-Half), we conducts regression analysis using regression Model 
1 on these two subset samples separately.  Table 7 displayed the results of 
the regression specified in regression Model 1 for the well-governed PLCs 
represented by Subset Sample 1 and less governed PLCs represented by 
Subset Sample 2. Subset Sample 1 of well-governed companies is a better 
model with the adjusted R² of 0.9351 if compared to Sample 2 of less-
governed  companies   with  an  adjusted   R² = of 0.6121.   The  effect  of  tax  
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 Table 7 Empirical Result of Regression Analysis on Subset Sample  
DV: Q Subset Sample 1 
Well-governed PLCs 
(N = 36) 
Subset Sample 2 
Less-governed PLCs 
(N = 46) 
Coefficient Std. 
Error 
t-statistic Prob. Coefficient Std. 
Error 
t-
statistic 
Prob. 
C 1.6100 0.9696 2.6605 0.1080 1.3918 1.0207 1.3636 0.1805 
TA -0.0190 0.0121 -1.5662 0.1285 -0.0156 0.0143 -1.0873 0.2836 
ROE 0.0026 0.0033 0.7731 0.4459 -0.0437 0.0259 -1.6852 0.0999 
ROA 0.2318 0.0190 12.2086 0.0000 0.2249 0.0457 4.9212 0.0000 
SIZE -7.2606 6.2606 -1.1611 0.2554 1.6505 3.0205 0.5439 0.5896 
LEV 0.0105 0.0096 1.0916 0.2843 0.0124 0.0127 0.9770 0.3346 
GROWTH -0.0020 0.0027 -0.724407 0.4748 -0.0016 0.0067 -0.2338 0.8164 
R-squared 0.9465 0.6638 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9351 0.6121 
F-statistic 82.6239 12.8326 
Prob. (F-Statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 
Durbin-Watson 2.202288 2.2349 
 
 
avoidance on firm value is negative although we do not find any significant 
relationship in both samples (β = -0.018975, p>0.05; β = -0.026990, p > 
0.05). Nevertheless, ROA has significant positive relationship with firm value 
(β = 0.231772, p < 0.00; β = 0.2249, p < 0.00), that can be interpreted as ROA 
will make greater the firm value for well-governed companies. 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
We examine the relationship between tax avoidance and after-tax value of 
Malaysian companies in an agency framework and found that tax avoidance 
is negatively associated with the valuation of the companies. We conclude 
that tax avoidance is not valued by shareholders and is in fact resulted in 
value reducing. Generally, the results are consistent with an agency cost 
theory of tax avoidance which perceived that the complex nature of tax 
avoidance would provide a shield for the self-serving managers to mask their 
action and exploit the wealth from tax saving activities. As a result, tax 
avoidance does not enhance the firm value. In other words, the direct effect 
of tax avoidance of increasing the firm value is potentially offset by the 
increased possibilities of rent diversion in the agency framework. This result 
is consistent with the result of prior studies. The study of Wang (2011) found 
that the benefits resulted from tax avoidance are potentially offset by 
agency costs and it reduces firm value in the Chinese Institutional Context. 
The result proves further the finding of Desai and Dharmapala (2009) that 
tax avoidance is not merely a transfer of wealth from government to the 
shareholders of company because tax avoidance would increase possibility 
of managerial opportunism and allow the tax savings to be piped into the 
opportunistic managers.  
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We then investigate if the corporate governance plays a role in mitigating 
the overall negative effect of tax avoidance on firm value in the agency 
framework. We predict that the agency problem will be lessened with 
governance control in place and tax avoidance activities should represent a 
transfer of value from government to shareholders and it increases firm 
value. However, we found that the strength of governance mechanism does 
not have any moderator effect on the relationship of tax avoidance and firm 
value. We further investigate whether the overall effect of tax avoidance on 
firm value will be different for well-governed companies and less-governed 
companies. Interestingly, we still found that tax avoidance has a negative 
impact on firm value, although the relationship becoming insignificant. 
Generally, our finding is inconsistent with the study of Desai and Dharmapala 
(2009) and Wang (2011).  Nevertheless, our findings have some similarity 
with Wang (2011) that the overall effect of tax avoidance which affects the 
firm value negatively is diminishing in well-governed companies. 
 
The traditional assumption that views corporate tax avoidance activities as 
value enhancement activities and the moderator effect of governance 
mechanism does not hold in this study. There are two possible explanations: 
(1) In this digital era with several atrocious news of global companies such as 
Starbucks, Google and Amazon have come under fire for avoiding paying tax 
on their sales, tax avoidance might lead to scepticism among investors of the 
traditional view of value-enhancement. The shareholders might place a 
lower value premium on companies who engaged in tax avoidance activities 
aggressively as it may affect the corporate reputation; (2) the corporate 
governance mechanisms in Malaysia are not effective, and/or there is 
inadequate relevant information provided to the shareholders for a 
possibility of control mechanism to function. 
 
The findings contribute to the literature by adding evidence on the economic 
consequences of tax avoidance as well as the corporate governance’s effect 
on tax avoidance in developing country. The empirical evidences from this 
study contributed to a growing line of research on tax avoidance and 
corporate governance in developing country. Most importantly, the study of 
Arif and Hashim (2013) on corporate governance and the value relevance of 
tax avoidance in Malaysia provides only preliminary evidence and this study 
added more evidence to the stream of literature that investigates the role of 
tax avoidance strategies, as moderated by the level of corporate 
governance, in determining the firm value in Malaysia. This study also 
attempts to understand the tax avoidance behaviour of company that would 
able to help the policymakers in formulating and implementing effective 
taxation systems in line with the dynamic economic environment in 
Malaysia. The findings in this study which revealed the negative relationship 
between corporate tax avoidance and firm value in Malaysia institutional 
setting suggested that companies to understand the negative consequences 
of corporate tax avoidance when engaging in tax planning aggressively.  
 
The limitation of our study is in using cross-sectional data by observing a 
sample at only one point in time due to time and financial constraints. 
Future study should consider using time-series data or panel data by 
analysing multiple companies at various points in time. Furthermore, it 
would be interesting for future researchers to explore tax avoidance and 
corporate transparency. Although corporate governance is closely related to 
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corporate transparency there are measured using different measurements. 
Corporate governance is determined by the accounting standards, law 
protection of shareholders whereas corporate transparency is predicted by 
using the level of information disclosure and timeliness of reporting. While 
collection of secondary data has been the method of data collection in most 
of the literatures studied the topic of tax avoidance and firm value in 
developed and developing countries, future researchers are recommended 
to engage a different method of data collection, for example in depth 
interview with the tax agents hired by big corporation for tax planning 
purposes.  
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